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THE CONCEPT OF INHERENT VICE 
During the 1950's there appeared in the Law Repor
ts a 
l 
succession of cases, which were argued by counsel
 on the basis 
of inherent vice; however, the proposition that a
n underwriter 
or carrier is not liable for the loss occasioned b
y any inherent 
defect in the subject matter of the contract, is b
y no means a 
product of twentieth century litigation. As earl
y as 1821,
2 
English courts were deciding that where goods were
 destroyed by 
an inherent defect, the underwriter was not liable
. The rationale 
3 
of the principle may have changed somewhat, and c
ertainly it has 
become a far more complex defence, but the basic p
roposition 
4 
evidenced above, was restated as recently as 1971 
in England, 
and will without doubt continue to be regarded as 
an important 
factor in the Law of Marine Insurance. 
This paper will attempt a critical survey of a fie
ld which, 
due perhaps to the more rewarding study of 'deviat
ion', fundamental 
breach and containerization, has not received a gr
eat deal of 
5 
consideration over recent years. This scarcity 
of academic 
comment should not however, be regarded as an indi
cation of slow 
development - over the last seventy years, courts 
throughout the 
world have frequently had occasion to refer to the
 words of Willes J. 
6 
in Blower v. Great Western Railway Company: 
"By the expression vice, I do not, of course, mean
 
moral vice in the thing itself or its owner, but o
nly 
that sort of vice which by its internal developmen
t 
tende to the destru~tion or the injury of the anim
al 
' .u. 
285834 
2. 
or thing to be carried, and which is likely to lead 
to such a result. If such a cause of destruction 
exists and produces that result in the course of a 
journey, the liability of the carrier (or underwriter) 
is necessarily excluded from the contract between the 
parties." 7 
The approach taken to inherent vice by the courts is the 
subject of the remainder of this paper. The influence of scientific 
developments on the doctrine will be discussed at the outset in order 
to show how the concept of inherent vice has changed. The paper 
will then proceed to a comparison of the place of inherent vice in 
the law of marine insurance, contracts of affreightment and sale of 
goods, and its relationship with the insurance principle of general 
average. A problem of evidence, viz. the onus of proof, which is 
a vital factor in this, a field which is based in the final analysis 
on an interpretation of the facts in any one particular case. will 
then be looked at, and the substantive paper will conclude with a 
discussion of the relationship between the provisions of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1908 and insurance policies, focussing on attempts to 
hold the insurer liable for loss caused by inherent defects. 
The Courts and Scientific Advances 
Over the last 150 years, the subject matter of marine insurance 
8 
policies in reported decisions has changed radically from livestock 
9 10 11 12 and slaves, to groundnuts, oils, and tinned goods; in fact 
all the raw materials and secondary products of a conunercial and 
industrialized world. At the same time, laboratory techniques 
and skills have progressed just as radically, making precise 
3. 
assessment of the cause of decay and destruction of goods a mere 
formality in many cases. 
It is not surprising therefore, to find the judgments of the 
courts, over the last fifty years especially, becoming increasingly 
technical and dependent upon scientific evidence. In 1930, Mr Justice 
13 
Wright in Bowring v. Amsterdam London Insurance Company, illustrated 
the respect many judges were beginning to show for the new methods of 
investigation: 
11
• • • He comes to this conclusion entirely by fact, 
somet:lmes by the sound ••• and by the feel of the hand. 
That method of testing, he says, has served him in the 
past. That may be where you have fairly reasonable 
crops ••• but it does appear however, that, however 
experienced Mr Eckford may be, his conclusions can only 
b very rough; and having regard to the general 
conditions of things at lhis place, I do not see any 
reason at all to accept the accuracy of his statement.
11 14 
Of tl.e scientific evidence presented at the trial, the learned judge 
stated: 
"No doubt, they are only laboratory experiments and 
to my mind not always helpful, when you have to consider 
what happens on a practical and COlllllercial scale; but 
the evidence is that mere heat without sufficient 
moisture in the nuts, could not create fermentation to 
any serious or appreciable extent." 15 
It is apparent from the jud81llent that for years, Mr Eck.ford's system 
had been the prevailing custom, and it is suggested that it would not 
be rash to claim that had this case been decided twenty years earlier, 
the evidence of that gentleman would have been readily accepted. 
Again in 1972, the words of Mr Justice Donaldson in F.M.C. Meat 
16 
Ltd. v. Fairfield Cold Stores, show the regard in which the courts 
now hold the 'expert' witness: 
4. 
"I thought Mr Reading was a pleasant, hardworking and 
honest witness, but he is not an expert refrigeration 
engineer." (Nor, one might well substitute, an expert 
physicist.) 17 
However, the courts took some time to trust completely the word 
of scientists and technicians. The doubts of Mr Justice Wright in 
1930 are to sane extent typical of the court's attitude in early years 
to the growth in technical evidence. In 1926, Mr Justice Roche, chose 
not to adopt evidence tendered by a 'battery' of eminent scientists as 
to the optimwn percentage of moisture in cigarettes, and accepted that 
of another cigarette exporter, whose sole qualification was practical 
18 experience; six years later, the United States Supreme Court decided 
that, having regard to 'the formidable array' of witnesses experienced 
in stowage, who approved the stowage in question, in such circumstances, 
the customs of the trade, and not the opinions of chemists, however 
sound, should be the test.
19 
Nevertheless, the courts in recent years have been more willing 
to accept scientific and laboratory tests a decisive evidence, and 
appear prepared to rule in favour of that evidence at the expense of 
well established 'coumercial methods' and customs.
20 
It is difficult 
to rationalize any change in the approach taken by the courts, but in 
this case, it could only be due to the gradual acceptance by society 
as a whole of the reliability of scientific techniques. Courts up 
till recently have been somewhat distrustful of tests conducted in 
'controlled' conditions, but it appears that now they have accepted 
the inevitable; one can be sure that in the future, cases involving 
inherent vice will consist largely of expert testimony. 
s. 
It must be emphasized, however, that these early cases were 
generally of a borderline nature - common to them all ia a conflict 
of evidence, and one can sympathi•e with the courts' reluctance to 
overthrow establiahed customs in the commercial world. But on the 
otb r hand, one could not deny that - today, the basic evidence 
before the courts is technical in nature, and this raises the very 
pertinent question as to whether in fact the qualities which made 
our judges such invaluable arbiters in the past, automatically make 
them the most suitable persons to weigh up the wealth of conflicting 
scientific evidence invariably presented today, 
The question must be, are our judges continuing to give a 
calculated and objective assessment of such evidence; or are they 
floundering as amateurs in a field which the expert microbiologist 
and biochemist find difficult to comprehend and come to any unanimous 
decision. Should they be replaced for findings of fact bys 
tribunal of experts? The issue is certainly worth more than the 
brief examination given here! 
However qualified the judges may be to arbitrate on questions of 
scientific evidence, their willingness to do so lll&Y have reduced the 
number of occasions when inherent vice will apply. Particularly in 
cases where the burden is on the cargo owner to initially affirm loss 
by a risk covered. it waa previously very difficult for him to prove 
that the loss was caused by anything but an inherent defect, if the 
goods were stowed or produced according to cu~tom. Now however, it 
is possible, with the advance of scientific techniques, for the 
6. 
former to produce reliable evidence that in a particular case. disease 
was caused through slightly excessive temperatures or perhaps by 
insufficient ventilation. He may in fact be able to prove by a 
process of elimination based on laboratory tests. that the goods 
could not have been da.naged in normal circumstances, but that the 
loss was due to factors within the control of the ship owner; in 
this case of course, negligence becOIJles an issue and the prospect of 
proving loss by risk becomes a much more feasible proposition. It 
follows as a matter of course that the underwriter may. in the future, 
find it more difficult to rely on inherent vice to exclude his 
liability under the policy. 
Contracts of Insurance and Contracts of Affreightment 
As with the contract of insurance, the common carrier operating 
under a contract of affreightment, has his responsibility for goods 
destroyed in transit limited in the case of loss by inherent vice. 
"Undoubtedly,." as Lord Dunedin stated in his speech in 
London & N.W. Canpany v. Richard Hudson & Sons Ltd. 21, 
11 though a common carrier is an insurer. yet if the damage 
arises from inherent vice or from bad packing of the goods, 
the cODlllon carrier is not liable. 11 22 
In addition, like the contract of marine insurance, the exception 
has been encompassed in the relevant statute. Section J(b) of the 
Sea Carriage of Goods Act 1940 states as follows: 
"Neither the ship nor her owner, agent, or master shall 
be responsible for loss or damages, arising or resulting 
fraa •••• 
(iv) inherent defect, quality, or vice of the thing 
concerned, 
(v) insufficiency of packing. 23 
7. 
However, while the principle finds axpr aaion in the law 
governing both contracts, the basis of liability under each is quite 
distinct, as is consequently in some aspects, the operation of the 
exception. 
The basis for the carrier's liability is founded on negligence, 
and arises from a breach of his contract which, unless limited, imposes 
24 
upon him all the duties of the cOlllllon carrier, and his relationship 
with the other parties is governed by the norraal rules of contract. 
The sole question in determining liability is whether the carrier was 
responsible for the damage to the goods; wae he in breach of his 
contractual duty? Consequently if the carrier, through hia neglig nc, 
aggravates or contributes to the process of decay, which could with 
reasonable care have been averted, he is liable, and the exception 
25 
of inherent vice does not operate. 
On the other hand, liability under an insurance policy arises 
automatically as soon as the casulty covered by the policy eventuates. 
Negligence of the assured or his ervanta giving riae to the peril 
insured against, does not defeat the claim of the assured. The 
insurer is ther fore liable for any lose 'proximately caused', by 
a peril insured against. 
One wat almost hesitate in using the word 'proximate' in this 
context, for its meaning cannot be regarded, in any way, aa settled. 
Causation appears to be at the root of many problcs pertaining to 
the doctrine under consideration and there is strong authority in 
favour of the view that it is within the 'realms of causation', 
8. 
that the uaantial diatinction in the application of the concept 
of inherent vice to contract• of insurance and affreiahtment lies.
26 
The basis for this point of view is to be found in the Court of Appeal 
27 
decision of~ v. Fl•ing, the facts of which were as follows: 
The plaintiff• were insured under a policy of marine insurance 
which covered hill again.at, inter alia, the perils of collision. At, 
a result of a collision, the ahip was delayed, the cargo of citrus 
fruit had to be offloaded, and upon eventual arrival, the fruit was 
found to have suffered considerable damage. The court however 
dismiseed the claim against the insurance company on the ground that 
th proximate cause of dauge was the perishable nature of the article 
itself, and the question as to the effect of the delay was irrelevant. 
Esher M.R., justified bia decision in a passage which is worth 
quoting at length: 
'' ••• but in cues of marine ineurance, only the causa 
prox:fma can be regarded. The question can only arise 
when there is a succession of causes, which 1111st have 
exieted in order to produce the result. Where that ia 
the case, according to the law of marine insurance, the 
last cause only must be looked at, and the others rejected, 
although the results would not have been produced without 
them. Here, there waa such a succession of causes •••• 
According to the English law of marine insurance, only 
the lut cause can be regarded. There ie nothing in 
the policy to say the underwriters will be liable for 
loss occasioned by that. To connect the loaa with any 
peril mentioned in the policy you must go back two steps, 
and that according to English law they are not permitted 
to do." 28 
All stated, there are those who believe that the distinction 
between the limitation of the insurer'• liability as compared to that 
9. 
of other persons which was drawn by Lord Esher M.R., still exists 
today, and they compare the English position to that of America 
where. it is claimed, a much more realistic and practical approach 
to the problem of causation is taken. 
It is submitted that this view is incorrect and at least fifty 
years out of date. 
29 
In Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Society, 
the House of Lords cOlllllented at some length on the law as laid down in 
Pink v. Fleming. Lord Shaw of Dunfermline was in no doubt as to the 
relative position of liability under marine insurance law: 
"My Lords, there was at one time an attempt to differentiate 
the same contractual words as used in a policy of marine 
insurance from the meaning of the same expression used in 
other mat:il:ime contracts, but in two judgments of your 
Lordships House in 1887, the practice was condemned." 30 
And again at page 369, he dealt with another of Lord Esher's heresies: 
11What does 'prox::lm.ate' he.re mean? To treat proximate 
cause as if it were the cause which is proximate in 
time is, as I have already said, out of the question. 
The cause which is truly proximate is that which is 
proximate in efficiency. That efficiency may have 
be~n preserved, although other causes may meantime 
have sprung up which have not yet destroyed it • • • and 
it may culminate in a result which it still r•ains 
the real effective cause to which the event can be 
ascribed." 
Moreover, one wonders whether it is really necessuy to adopt 
the American approach, when the case c01D11only cited as an example 
31 of American practice, applied a meaning to 'proximate' quite 
consistent with that given by the House of Lords. Indeed an earlier 
American Supreme Court decision had this to say about Lord Esher M.R's 
decision: 
10. 
"It eeema neither of these caaes32 went to the House of 
Lords and we find it :fmposaible to reconcile Lord Esher's 
ruling - ••• - with the elaborate exposition of the doctrine 
of proximat cause which haa been given by the House of 
Lords in Leyland ShipPi!!I Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Inaurance 
Society, from which we have quoted. And it is recognized in 
England that passages in Lord Esher's judpent ••• to the 
effect that not only the cause last in time can be looked 
to, cannot now be supported." 33 
Thus, having regard to the above deci1iona, there must be at the 
very least considerable doubt u to whether the approach taken in 
34 ~ v. Flaning is still good law, and it is my opinion that to hold 
so, is to unnecessarily complicate the role of causation in maritime 
insurance law; it is in short, a view not at all in accordance with 
the most r cent English authority. There is, it is submitted, no 
basis for such a distinction to be drawn, and the approach taken by 
Lord Shaw in the House of Lords is surely. having regard to develop-
ments of the law in the field of causation and remoteness of damage, 
the comon sense one. 
The concept of causation aside, the courts do not appear to have 
diacriminated against the insurer generally, as c0111pared to the carrier, 
presumably because they are well aware that the carrier himself will 
invariably be covered. But in at least one case, the English courts 
have taken a somewhat liberal stand in stating the burden of proof on 
35 
a carrier who attempts to prove inherent vice. In Bradley v. F.S.N.C, 
apples exported from Australia were found to have rotted upon arrival 
in England. The plaintiffs proved that the apples were of good quality 
upon departure, but failed to prove conclusively that the damage was 
caused through the negligence of the ship owner, The carrier, howwer, 
11. 
in turn, could not identify the inherent vice which specifically 
caused the rot. Two passages by Lord Sumner are worth repeating 
at this stage, although the specific topic of 'burden of proof' will 
be dealt with later. 
At page 267 Lord Sumner stated: 
"Accordingly, in strict law, on proof being given of the 
actual good condition of the apples on shipment, and of 
their damaged condition on arrival, the burden of proof 
passed from the conaignees to the ship owners to prove 
some ezcepted peril which relieved them from liability." 
As we will see later, the courts have often placed a very heavy 
onus on the insurer to prove he c0tnea within the exception, and this 
approach has generally been adopted by courts dealing with contracts 
of af freightment. However, in Bradley'• case, Lord Sumner laid down 
a general rule of law whieh can only be regarded as sympathetic to the 
cause of the carrier: 
".. • Such being the scheme to which the Comnonwealth Act 
gives expression. can it be said either that the ship-
owner must fail, if they cannot epecify what the 
particular quality of inherent vice in the cargo might 
have been •••• 11 36 
His Lordship went on at pas 271 of the Report, to state that so 
long as the shipowner can prove that there was no maltreatment of the 
goods, that would be sufficient to negate the shipper's claim; 
consequently the carrier wins _!.!_rtually..J?_y default. Clearly, while 
the decision on the facta in ~radley's case may perhaps have been 
justified, the general proposition of law stated by Lord SUlllner is 
plainly inconsistent with hia original summary of the law relating 
to the burden of proof on the carrier, and it is aubmitted that this 
12. 
approach can only be explained by ref81'ence to a posaibl• distinction 
in the court's attitude to the liability of the carrier and underwriter 
respectively. 
Inherent Vice and Contracts for the Sale of Goode 
Since neither the underwriter nor the carrier is liable for losa 
caused by inherent defects in th subject matter of the contract, one 
would expect that the seller would automatically bear such loss in a 
contract for the sale of gooda. 
But the problem appears to be 1ll0re complex thane contract of 
insurance or affreightment, there being a distinction drawn between 
two classes of loss, both of which would be construed as loss by 
inherent vice, if the contract waa one of insurance. The courts 
have found it necessary to distinguish the following two situations: 
firstly, where all goods of the contract specifications would neceeaarily 
suffer a certain amount of deterioration in transit, and have deteriorated 
no more than would be expected under the circmstancea in question, and 
secondly, where SOile goods of the contract kind would bear transportation 
with no lose, while others, becaude of an inherent defect peculiar to 
31 ,!h!!! - not their genre - would not. The following observation of 
Diplock J. in Mash & Murrell Ltd. v. Joseph I. F.mmanuel Ltd., 38 makes 
this distinction clear: 
"It is only the estraordinary deterioration of the good• 
due to abnormal conditions experienced during transit 
for which the buyer takes the riak. A neceaaary and 
inevitable deterioration during transit which will render 
them umaerchantable on arrival, is normally one for which 
the seller is liable." 39 
13. 
One c0111111entator, has however gone further than recognising that 
the initial distinction exiets and has put forward the view, that 
while the seller should be held liable for any inevitable deterioration 
arising from inadequate packing of the goods, or resulting from his 
employing insufficient means ot conveyance, he should not be liable 
otherwise for loases during transit, generated by the nature of the 
40 
goods themselves. Any implied warranty as to fitness for transit 
extends only to the condition of the goods when they leave the seller's 
possession and he is not liable for an:~ deterioration resulting during 
the transit. 41 
There is judicial sup-port for this proposition. In Bowden Bros. 
42 
& Co. Ltd. v. Little, a cargo of onions, merchantable in regard to 
condition and quality at daparture, were found to have rotted during 
the voyage and to be unfit £or aale. The High Court of Australia 
(Griffiths C.J. • Barton ed Issacs JJ.), b.eld that it was a questiou 
of fact depending on all the circumstances whether, and to what extent, 
the purchaser relied upon the skill or judgm.ent of the vendors to 
supply goods fit foT the purpose of shipment to Sydney. and that this 
was definitely not a warranty to be implied into every contract for 
sale of goods. Ultimately the question must be decided upon the extent 
to which the purchaser did in fact rely upon the skill and judpent of 
the defendant. Nevertheless, it is submitted that this case is by no 
means irreconcilable with those that take what appears to be a contrary 
approach. Surely, where both parties know the goods are of a perishable 
nature, there:!!!!! be implied a warranty or condition that the goods were 
14. 
fit to survive the normal transit. Later cuea have certainly 
adopted this approach and it ta without doubt consistent with 
c0111111.0n sense. What buyer would accept goods without a warranty 
when he knew there waa a possibility of them perishing? 
Later authorities provide an interesting contrast to the 
Bowden Bros. case. In 1960 Diplock J. in Mash & Murrell Ltd, v. 
43 
Joseph I. Emmanuel Ltd., decided that in c.1.f. and c. & f. 
contract, there was an implied condition that the goods should 
remain of merchantable quality from the time of shipment. throughout 
the nomal tranait to the destination, and thereafter a reasonable 
time for disposal; the learned judge held furthermore, that having 
44 
regard to later authority, the Bowden Bros. case was perhaps no 
longer good law. Forty years previously, Mr Justice Hilbury had 
45 
held in Broome v. Pardee& Co-Operative Society, that:-
" • • • These wol'da seem to me to be strong enough to show 
that what is fundamental is that the goods must be merchant-
able, and, where they are periahable goods and the contract 
contanplatea they have a transit to undergo, merchantable 
not only at the beginning of the transit, though that would 
appear to be the place for delivery under the contract, but 
they must be merchantable in the sense that. at the place 
for delivery under the contract, they are in a suitable 
and fit condition for the transit norm.ally to be expected. 11 46 
It has been argued that commercial practice demands that such a 
warranty be not implied, but it is submitted that the existence of 
such a practice should be doubted. In Bowden Bros. Griffiths C,J. 
stated that such an implied warranty would be uncanJ10n in a c,1.f. 
contract, because the buyer would always be covered by iDaurance. 
But this is quite patently a fallacious approach; the protection 
15. 
any nomal insurance polidy gives would be worthleaa, since, as we 
have discovered, the underwriter 18 not liable for loss caused by 
inherent Vice. It must be queried whether any buyer would make a 
binding agreement to buy perishable goods, without securing eotae 
recourse again.at the seller, if they are destroyed by their own 
vice during a normal transit. 
Certainly it appears that curr nt judicial authority is quite 
definite in its decision to imply a warranty of fitness for transit, 
and it is by no means unlikely that if such a cODBDercial practice did 
exist, the courts would refuse to adopt it, having regard to the 
obvious unjust consequences that could be reached. 
General Average 
The place of inherent vice in the laws of General Average, is 
worth mentioning, if only because it is one occasion when the presence 
of an inherent defect aa a causal factor, does not constitute a complete 
defence. It is no answer, either in English or American law, to a 
claim to contribution, that the necessity for eacr1fice was occasioned 
47 
by an inherent defect in the property sacrificed. 
48 
Thus in Greensheilds v. Stephens, where a fire broke out in the 
hold of a ship. due to spontaneous combustion of some coal, and the 
whole cargo was damaged in an effort to extinguish it, the House of 
Lords held that the fact that the inherent vice of the coal caused, 
in a sense, the loss, was no defence to a claim for contribution. 
16. 
This general rule of law, which both the House of Lords and 
the United State• Court of Appeal in the William J. Quilliam case, 49 
laid down, 1a open to the criticism that it may be quite unjust in 
operation. Although in Greenahield's case, KennedyLJ., sitting 
50 in the Court of Appeal, limited his judpient to cover only the cargo 
which had~ initially spontaneously erupted. Lord Alverstone C.J. in 
the sane court and the full House of Lords, stated a rule of general 
application which covered all cargo damaged, regardlese of the nature 
of the loss, i.e. by fire or water. It is possible to understand the 
court allowing the contribution claim in respect of that cargo~ 
originally damaged by the inherent defect, but why should the cargo 
owner be able to reduce his loss in respect of such cargo destroyed 
b y inherent vice, because, due to the emergency other cargo was 
damaged. Normally, of course, he would bear the full loss. 
For the insurer, ironically, it is also the only time when, 
51 barring express coverage of such loss, he has to pay out for damage 
caused by inherent vice. For under a policy of Marine Insurance, the 
insurer ia nonnally liable for contributions made to general average 
claims. 
This final point highlights the unpredictable nature of the law 
in this area and if consiatency and rationality were ever criteria for 
evaluating a judicial decision, then those discuased above are long 
overdue for distinguishing. 
17. 
The Onus of Proof 
As far as contracts of affreightment are concerned, there can be 
no doubt that in English law, the onus is on the carrier to prove that 
S2 
the loss was occasioned by inherent vice. Similarly accepted, is 
the general proposition that the aHured must prove that his loss was 
caused by a peril insured against and not something arising from the 
53 
subject matter of the goods themselves. In so far as the latter 
proposition lays down a general rule of law, that the burden is upon 
the assured to show that the loss was~ from inherent vice, it is 
submitted that while such an analysis might well be correct in strict 
theory, in practice, the approach of the courts has been far from 
uniform. 
In that writers on insurance draw an initial distinction between 
the onus of the assured under an 'all risks' and 'specific' insurance 
policy respectively, they are quite ~orrect. 
"(In) insurances against all ri,ks," stated Mr Justice Roche 
in Sa$soon & Co. v. Yorkshire Insurance Company, 54 
"I can under•tand it being said, •once you prove some 
external danage, d&!!lage happening frOl'll something outside 
the goods, if you have insured against all risks', you need 
not prove what risk it is, because you are insured against 
than all. so long as it is 801\lething which happens 
externally and not the condition of the goods themselves.' 
That is not the position when you are insured against a 
specific peril and you have to show some damage caused 
by that specific peril, subject to the reservation that 
if the peril results from the condition of the thing 
itself, the underwriter is relieved," 5.5 
The question to be looked at, is what are the practical consequences 
of the distinction. 
Turning first to the onus of proof in an 'all risks' policy, as 
18. 
tated previously, English authority all appears to place the onus 
of proving a casylty as opposed to a loss caused by internal activity, 
upon the assured. The Rouse of Lords made this quite clear in 
British and Foreign Marine Insurance v. Gaunt, 56 and the House's 
57 decision in this case, particularly the judgment of Lord Sumner, 
has been followed in two relatively recent cases. In F. w. Berk & 
58 
Co. Ltd. v. Style. Sellers J., decided that the onus was on the 
plaintiff to pTove that the loss or the expense was due to an accident 
or casuley, and found on tbe facts that the latter had not managed this. 
Four years earlier, Mr Justice Croome-Johnson in Theordorou v. Cheater, 59 
laid dmm in the moat forthright terms yet, the burden of proof the 
assured must bear when making a claim: 
"The onus of proof is of course upon the plaintiff to 
establish these things vhich I have indicated earlier 
in the judgment. There is no onus on the defendant 
either to account for. or try to explain or satisfy 
me in any way about the matters which have been m84e 
on behalf of the plaintiff." 
It is clear however, that while the courts confonn to the approach 
taken in British and Foreign Marine Insurance v. Gaunt with respect to 
the onus in 'all risks' policies, they assume that there is a heavier 
onus on the assured under a 'specific' policy as compared to an 'all 
risks'. Briefly stated, my proposition is that this belief may well 
not be the practical effect of the English authorities at all. 
The English courts, when adjudicating claims under insurance 
policies giving a specific coverage, have taken what is in practice. 
a remarkably liberal approach (at lea,t from the asaured's point of 
view). The leading authority is the jud81Jlent of Mr Justice Roche in 
19. 
60 
Sassoon v. Yorkshire I]!!uranc~.COlllpany ~~., where the policy 
concerned covered loss through, inter alia, 'mould and mildew'. 
Roche J. said of the respective burdens of the parties to the 
policy: 
"Yet, in my judgment, the plaintiffs are right in their 
contention that, in the circumstancea of this case, 
the onus of establishing the precise cause of the mould 
and mildew is upon the defendants, and having established 
in the affirmative, that mould and mildew have occurred 
t~ the cigarettes, and have caused the damage, then it 
is upon the defendants, in the cirCU1J1.stances of this 
case, to satisfy me that the occurrence of the mould 
and mildew was due to the inherent vice of the soods." 61 
In the Court of Appeal, Bankes L.J. agreed with Mr Justice Roche 
on this point, as did Scrutton L.J., who claimed that if you prove its 
occurrence (i.e. the mould), you automatically have a casulty, unless 
the underwriters ahow it happened aa a result of the qualities or 
defects of the subject insured. 
Further support for this premise can be gathered from the 
judg,:nent of Wright J. in Bowrin,g & Co. v. Amsterdam London Insurance 
62 .f.£•, where he held that while in the policy before him, it was for 
the plaintiffs to prove, 'leaking or sweating from an external cause', 
if the words 'external cause' had not been included in the policy and 
it had read only 'leaking and sweating', he would have decided that 
the burden of proof lay on the defendant underwriters, once damage 
by leaking etc. was shown. 
These judicial pronouncements represent validly the approach 
taken by English courts to policies of specific insurance, and it is 
submitted that to state as a general rule, that the onus is on the 
20. 
assured, is to ignore the practical realities of the situation. 
The approach taken by the courts is hardly uniform, and they appear 
to have adopted a different standard for each kind of contract, an 
approach which leads to a rather unusual result. For while legal 
personalia agree that the assured has a lighter burden of proof under 
an 'all risks' policy, in practice, because of the necessity to prove 
a casulty conclusively, he has in many cases a more difficult burden 
to overcome than the assured under a 'specific' policy. The latter 
of course, shifts the burden onto the insurer as soon as the damage 
occurs, be it by fire, mould, mildew or sweating, and the latter must 
prove the inherent defect's existence. 
Th reason for this lack of uniformity is not clear. There is 
no indication that it stems from a sympathetic outlook towards the 
assured who has to rely on a specific peril and there is certainly no 
justification for a distinction on this ground. Any rationalisation 
of the differing approaches n11st, it is submitted, be based on an 
argument of evidence. The assured under the wider policy is insured 
against 'all risks', and the mere fact that his goods are damaged in 
sane way, is not sufficient evidence for the court that the lose was 
caused by a 'risk' or casu~fy. The damage of goods by a peril, ~ 
specifically insured against, is on the other hand, prima facie evidence 
that the loss occurred throl.lgh a casulty, against which the assured was 
covered. This is surely a realistic approach based on a normal 
reaction to the tactual ituations before the court. If I insure my 
cargo of coal under an 'all riska' policy, the fact that it suddenly 
21. 
bursts into flames of its own accord, is not really any evidence 
that it was danaged by an external cause. But if a cargo of corn 
is being transported through the tropics in the wet season, and it 
1s insured specifically against 'mould or mildew', then if that mould 
appeared, the presumption would be that it was caused by the hmid 
climate, the risk insured against. 
Whatever the reason for the distinction, the practical consequences 
may be tremendous; the arguments being based mainly on an analysis of 
relevant facts, the onus of proof can be in many caaes the determining 
63 factor, and it certainly appears to be the case that if the prospective 
policy holder is sure of the particular danage hia goods are susceptible 
to, it will be both cheaper, and in the event of any diapute, legally 
to his advantage to insure against the specific danger and leave the 
'all risks' policy well alone. 
Contracting out of the Protection of the Marine Insurance Act 1908 
Section 55(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1908 contemplates that 
parties may contract out of the statutory exemption to liability of 
loss by inherent viee. 
The question as to what terms must be included in a contract of 
insurance to extend the insurer's liability, has received a considerable 
amount of judicial and acadenic comnent64 over the past tew years, and 
it is to this topic that we must now turn to. 
The consistent approach of the courts has been that for an insurer 
to extend his liability, his reference to the cover of inherent defects 
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in goods 11U&t be express, or at the very least, clearly implied. 
This attitude is based on the assumption (probably quite correct), 
that an insurance policy ia designed to cover 'risks' and not 
'certainties' of loss. The traditional rationale ia that given by 
Lord Birkenhead C.J •• in British and Foreign Marine Insurance v. Gaunt: 65 
11There are of courae limits to 'all risks'. They are 
risks and risks insured against. Accordingly the 
expression does not cover inherent vice or mere wear 
and te r. • •• It covers a risk, not a certainty; 
it ia something which happens to the subject matter 
from without, not the natural behaviour of the subject 
matter, being what it is, under the circumstances in 
which it is carried." 66 
With these coaments in mind, courts have been reluctant to read 
into insurance policies any extension of the insurer's traditional 
liability, but there are several cases which give some indication of 
what terms will be required. 
In Sassoon v. Yorkshire Insurance Company Ltd., 67 the policy 
covered 'damage by fresh water, mould and/or fire. irrespective of 
percentage'. In the Court of Appeal, both Scrutton and BankesUJ., 
thought that this policy was not wide enough to cover mould caused by 
inherent vice. Atkin L.J. was not, however, of this opinion: 
"It sema to me conceivable, if apt words are used, 
that an assured may cover a loss occasioned by mould 
which he does not know enough about, to know whether 
it will or will not happen during the voyage, and 
which in fact, may happen during the voyage, but may 
not •••• 
In this particular case, I think there is e0111ething 
to be said for the view that the intention of the 
parties was to cover mould or mildew arising from any 
cause whatsoever; that is one of the matteJ's that waa 
in the mind of the assured. It is quite unnecessary 
for me to decide that point here •••• " 68 
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Lord Atkin made during these observations one very important 
point, which even today is confusing the issue. Lord Birkenhead C.J. 
in Gaunt's case, spoke of an 'inherent vice' as a 'certainty'. This 
assumption, it is submitted, is quite wrong, and that, as Atkin L.J. 
pointed out, an assured might well cover a loss, which, because he does 
not know enough about the goods in question, he is not quite sure will 
eventuate or not. For example, tinned pork has, under certain 
conditions, a tendency to blow - this is an inherent defect of that 
particular product. But no one is quite sure just what conditions 
will lead to such an increase of pressure so as to cause this result. 
Could not a person validly insured against this sort of 'risk', under 
an 'all risks' policy? I see no reason why not, except of course for 
the narrow interpretation placed by the courts on the word 'risk'. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of this area was 
69 
undertaken by Sellers J. in F. W. Berk v. Style, where the relevant 
clause was, ~all risks of loss and/or damage from any cause whatsoever". 
One could hardly imagine a wider insurance clause, yet although Mr 
Justice Sellers seemed very sympathetic to the assured's claim that 
this policy was intended to cover inherent vice, he eventually ruled 
against this interpretation, on the grounds that certain clauses of 
the Institute Cargo Clauses (War Time Extension) which excluded losses 
by inherent vice, were included in the policy and the parties were 
bound by their written contract. 
Generally, however, the courts have been very cautious in their 
reading of insurance policies. There have been to my knowledge, only 
24. 
two reported decision.a in England or the C0111monwealth where the courts 
have actually awarded a claim, based on losa caused by inherent vice.
70 
In a third decision, Overseas Comnodities v. Style,
71 the policy in 
which expressly included loss from inherent vices, the court placed 
a very restrictive interpretation on a conditional guarantee clause 
w-hich excused the insurers from liability, on the grounds that, uin 
view of the departure from the normal form of cover, it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that underwriters would seek to limit the 
extension within certain bounds •••• " 
72 Quite frankly, it is difficult 
to appreciate this conservative approach. In this case, there was 
definitely no certainty that the tina of pork would 'blow' - the 
insurer would never have given the extended cover if this waa the cue. 
Surely, if the parties to the contract make it abundantly clear that 
they wish to insure against a particular contingency, the courts should 
accept their intention and treat the case upon its merits, without 
restricting it in accordance with what they conaider 'the normal 
insurance policy' encompasses. 
American courts have shown the sane lack of awareneas. In Chute v. 
73 
N. River Insurance Canpany, the sole issue was whether the assured 
could recover for the cracking of an opal ae the result of an inherent 
defect, under a policy covering nall risks' in transportation". 
Although this was not a contract of marine insurance, the judge stated 
that he was applying principles traditionally applicable to contracts 
of that kind, and said there oould be no claim. He baaed this finding 
on the rule that explicit language was needed to indicate that there 
25. 
was an intention to extend the effect of the policy beyond 
damages 
caused by a 'casulty' and to cover losses resulting from au
tomatic 
internal deterioration. 
Today the courts appear to place a great deal of emphasis o
n 
74 
surrounding circumstances and in the absence of any defin
ite 
indication that the parties intended such a loss to be cove
red, the 
court will remain unconvinced. The present attitude of the c
ourts 
was plainly put by Sellers J. in Berk v. Style: 
"Having regard to the established law in the matter, 
if the plaintiff had wished to insure against 
inherent vice - if indeed, they could have done so 
at any reasonable premium - they should have used 
specific words to that effect, or at least had 
clause 6, or the relevant part of it, struck out.'' 75 
There appears little hope for a more realistic approach by 
the courts. Unless express inclusion of loss by inherent vi
ce 
becomes common practice, the courts will no doubt continue 
to 
'protect' the underwriter in many causes of action in which,
 on an 
ordinary reading of the contract concerned, his liability ap
pears 
certain. 
Prospects for Reform and Future Development 
As should have become apparent during the course of this pap
er, 
the law relating to inherent vice can hardly be regarded as 
settled. 
Its concept has changed radically from the days when it was 
used, 
inter alia, to prevent 'slavers' who had abused their charge
s from 
claiming an indemnity when the latter died of starvation. 
But there 
26. 
are still Bome serious anomalies: for example, it 1a well established 
76 that, although it may be an undue extension of the concept, damage 
caused by insufficient packing constitutes damage by an inherent 
defect. 77 The disturbing thing is, that in the only 'recent' authority 
directly on point, it was held that a carrier may rely on that defence, 
even though he was aware that the goods might well be damaged because 
78 of this inadequacy. This decision appears completely irreconcilable 
with the general law as to the duties of common carriers, which are of 
course based on negligence. Some mitigation of th:18 extreme position 
may have been achieved by a aubsequent Court of Appeal decision, 
79 Silver v. Ocean S.S. Company; here, Slesser L.J. distinguished 
the earlier case, and held that unless the condition of the goods' 
packing was admitted in the bill of lading, the carrier would be 
estopped from relying on the defence if he was aware of such defects. 
It is unfortunate that he did not 30 further and overrule the previous 
authority, since the situation remains unremedied and the decision in 
Gould v. S.E.C. Railway is still the law today. 
Indeed, the basic concept of inherent vice is perhaps, open to 
the criticism, that in some fields of insurance law in particular, 
its operation is quite unjust. If we refer again to the example of 
the cargo of corn insured against mildew in a humid climate; it is 
submitted that there is no real basis for a rule that a loss by mildew 
should be excluded on the grounds of some excess moisture in the corn 
itself. It may be that in 'all risk' marine policies the concept of 
inherent vice should provide an exception to liability, since in thia 
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case, any such loss is not caused by a peril insured againet. But 
if the loas is caused by the specific peril the aaaured hu paid to 
have cover against, should it make any difference that internal and 
not external development• gave rise to that peril? Surely, if the 
underwriter is liable for losses by ~ildew occasioned through the 
negligence of the shipowner or his servant, he should be responsible 
for loss caused by inherent vice in the corn itself. The question 
is quite simple. 'What caused the loss? Was it a peril insured 
against?' - In the hypothetical situation outlined above, the answer 
is, it is submitted, equally straightforward - 'Yes'f 
It is unfortunate perhaps, that the basic concept of inherent 
vice has been well established for over fifty years; it is now only 
within the various components of the defence that any uncertainty lies
, 
and one would doubt whethe"L any court today would care to challenge 
the validity of the basis of the exception. Any reform is clearly a 
case for the legislature in this field. 
Moves have begun however, on an international level, to ranedy 
some of the more apparent defects in the concept as it stands today. 
At its fourth session held in Geneva in April 1971, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), adopted a recommend
ation 
to consider the subject of bills of lading as the topic of priority in
 
its programme of analysing international shipping legislation. 
Amongst 
the subsidiary rec01llllendatione made are some relating specifically to 
inherent vice. 
28. 
This move has been chiefly sponsored by the developing nations
 
who consider that the Hague Rules, which were formulated at a 
time 
when they were unable to express their problems and their inte
rests 
were not thought to be important, discriminate against the shi
pper 
by imposing upon him unduly heavy risks of ocean carriage. T
hey 
wish, accordingly, to return to the carrier most of the liabil
ity 
for losses which have been historically borne by him and thus 
restore 
a reasonably equitable relationship between carrier and shippe
r. 
The basis for their discontent is basically economic: the 
developing nations claim that they are bearing a disproportion
ate 
amount of the loss occasioned during transport by sea. The f
irst 
complaint of the developing nations is that there is a great d
eal 
of uncompensated loss; in many cases the cargo owners have to
 accept 
the carrier's decision of distribution of loss rather than acc
ept 
the alternative of expensive and unpredictable litigation. S
econdly, 
because of the many exceptions granted to the carrier by the H
ague 
Rules, it is impossible to determine the certainty of compens
ation; 
subsequently there is a great deal of 'overlapping' or 'double
' 
insurance effected by cargo owners. Finally, there is a gene
ral 
disturbance of the overall distribution of loss. Since the in
cidence 
of costs is mainly on the cargo owners, there is a real income
 transfer 
from countries which are mainly cargo owners to those which ar
e 
predominantly carriers (developing and developed nations respe
ctively), 
making the former, to some extent, the economic scapegoats for
 the 
developed world. 
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All these complaints are directly applicable to the problem of 
inherent vice, particularly so, having regard to the increasing 
complexities of evidence and problems of burden of proof and 
consequent expense, which must discourage some from disputing the 
compensation offered by the carrier. 
To this end the comnents as to inherent vice relate to two 
specific problem areas, both of which have been dealt with at 
varying lengths in this paper. The first concerns the Rules• basic 
exception of inherent vice (Article 4(2)(m)); viz. the burden and 
method of proving inherent vice, and the general intention is that 
these should be clarified by amendment. The second problem area is 
that of 'insufficiency of packaging' under Article 4(2)(n) of the 
Hague Rules. It is not clear in what circumstances the carrier can 
claim this exemption; nor is it settled what must be included in a 
bill of lading to prevent him being estopped from relying on it. 
This should also be rectified by amendment. The final point is 
that there is a claim that 'customary tolerances' should be 
specifically included as an 'inherent vice', by reason of which 
the carrier is exempted from liability. 
Thus it appears as though in the near future, while the basis 
of the concept will not be attacked, certainly some of the problem 
areas may be remedied on an international scale. 
30. 
CONCLUSION 
The law relating to inherent vice must be unique in that it is 
surely the only field in which the courts have constantly protected 
the insurer, be he a professional underwriter or a cOIJlllon carrier, 
against liability to the assured. As has been seen, it may be that 
the courts have been rather kinder to the colllDon carrier than to the 
underwriter, but while it appears that in some particular cases, the 
onus of proof has been put upon the underwriter to bring himself 
within the exception, the courts have been reluctant to interfere 
with or make any deliberate attempt to decrease the limitations on 
his liability. The rationale behind this approach is probably that 
they refuse to make the insurer accept liability for an act of the 
owner of the goods which would probably amount to a breach of the 
Sale of Goode Act - but as was stated earlier in this paper, if this 
is the intention of the parties concerned, is it right for the courts 
to limit that intent? The situation has now, however, become very 
interesting since, with the UNCITRAL developments, it appears very 
much as though the concept of inherent vice will in the future be 
subject to political, as well as legal influences in its future 
development. 
One thing is certain; any such move to remove the limitations 
of carriers and underwriters' liability will be strongly opposed by 
the latter - for these people the exception in the past has been 
often a saviour; for the owner of the goods, it may have meant ruin! 
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